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Abstract: This paper assesses some challenges posed by evolutionary de-
bunking arguments in Joyce’s function and Street’s contingency versions to 
moral realism, understood as the metaethical theory according to which 
there are moral facts that are absolute, universal and context-independent. 
Some argue that Copp’s society centred realism is untenable given that it 
cannot support counterfactuals. Shafer-Landau and Huemer’s arguments are 
also subject to debunking because they cannot persuasively show that hu-
man morality is unaffected by evolutionary forces. In Huemer’s view, moral 
progress is proof of moral facts. It requires moral realism due to progress 
being context-dependent. From an evolutionary point of view, there are no 
previous standards and ideals concerning the direction of progress. Finally, a 
possible answer to the function version of the evolutionary debunking ar-
guments is the possibility that the nature of human language (including mor-
al language) is such that, in essence, it cannot be convincingly divided in 
language about facts and language about value. 
Keywords: Evolution of morality. Moral realism. Moral progress. Richard 
Joyce. Sharon Street. 
Duas versões do argumento evolucionário da moralidade e             
seus desafios ao realismo moral 
Resumo: Este artigo avalia alguns desafios colocados pelos argumentos 
evolutivos da moralidade na versão de Joyce e Street ao realismo moral, 
entendido como a teoria metaética segundo a qual existem fatos morais que 
são absolutos, universais e independentes de contexto. Argumenta-se que o 
realismo centrado na sociedade de Copp é insustentável, pois não pode 
 





sustentar contrafactuais. Os argumentos de Shafer-Landau e Huemer tam-
bém estão desacreditados, porque eles não podem mostrar de forma convin-
cente que a moralidade humana não é afetada pelas forças evolutivas. No 
caso do argumento de Huemer, mostra-se que a existência de progresso 
moral não pode ser considerada como prova da existência de fatos morais, 
como exige o realismo moral, porque o progresso depende do contexto e 
também porque, do ponto de vista evolutivo, não há padrões e ideais anteri-
ores para os quais o progresso é direcionado. Finalmente, uma possível 
resposta aos argumentos evolutivos da moralidade é a possibilidade de que a 
natureza da linguagem humana (incluindo a linguagem moral) seja tal que, 
em essência, ela não possa ser convincentemente dividida em linguagem 
sobre fatos e linguagem sobre valores. 
Palavras-chave: Evolução da moral. Realismo moral. Progresso moral. 
Richard Joyce. Sharon Street. 
1 INTRODUCTION (EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING 
ARGUMENTS IN BRIEF) 
Darwin, regarding the moral consequences of the evolutionary 
theory, wrote:  
If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under pre-
cisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt 
that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sa-
cred duty to kill their brothers and mothers would strive to kill their 
fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering. (Darwin 
[1886]1989, p. 99) 
The quotation above shows the main tenet used by some moral 
evolutionary theorists to claim that if morality is the outcome of a 
natural evolutionary process, the existence of some universal, objec-
tive and absolute moral standards is not possible. According to which 
such standards or norms exist, the theory is known in Moral Philoso-
phy as ‘Moral Realism’; and the arguments according to which the 
evolutionary theory discredits those universal standards (posited by 
Moral realism) are known as Evolutionary Debunking Arguments 
(EDA’s).2 There are many versions of moral realism.3 However, 
 
2 For a complete bibliography and an updated account about the evolutionary de-
bunking arguments discussion, see: Leibowitz, 2020. 
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broadly understood, it consists of the metaethical thesis according to 
which moral facts are independent of any evaluative human attitude 
(Shafer-Landau, 2003, p. 15). So, from this view, if the moral judg-
ment “it is wrong to torture an innocent person for amusement” is 
true, then there is a state of affairs depicted or described by the 
judgment. In virtue of its accurate depiction of this state, the judg-
ment is true, no matter the perspective or view of the people stating 
it. The depicted state of affairs is, notwithstanding the particular de-
sires or intentions of those people considering it true and independ-
ent of someone deeming it true. Moral realism believes that everyone 
who regards this moral judgment as false is wrong because moral 
facts are as they are, in virtue of depicting a universal, objective, and 
necessary state of affairs, independently of any perspective, and be-
forehand any human evaluative attitude. 
Moral realism claims that there are moral facts according to which 
the moral judgments are true or false and that moral statements de-
pict those facts. In this sense, moral realism is a form of cognitivism. 
In general, “the key thought for cognitivism is that the sentence [the 
moral statement] purports to describe how things are” (Bedke, 2017, 
p. 293). According to this commitment to cognitivism for moral real-
ism, the truth or falsity of moral statements is independent of any 
human evaluative attitude. 
However, there is no consensus among realists about what those 
facts are. Some realists hold that moral facts are just natural facts 
(Copp, 1995; Sturgeon, 1985; Collier & Stingl, 2019), while others are 
non-natural (Moore, 1903; Shafer-Landau 2003; Enoch 2011; Parfit 
2011). 
Some other realists hold that moral facts are dependent upon hu-
man nature or social practice (Copp, 2008). It is claimed that this 
belief does not undermine their realist pretension because the alleged-
ly moral facts are objective, universal, and necessary. As it has been 
shown, the moral statements are supposed to depict how the world 
is, and it is to say, the moral statements under the view of moral real-
ism are fully representational: they express beliefs, being fact-stating 
and truth-evaluable. 
 
3 For a general account see: Sturgeon, 1985; Railton, 1986 and Boyd, 1988. 
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This kind of metaethical theory, known as “moral realism”, is the 
target of evolutionary debunking arguments. This paper assesses the 
two main versions of evolutionary debunking arguments: the func-
tion and the contingency one. Joyce’s function version is based on 
the claim that the evolutionary function of morality is not depicting 
any state of affairs but strengthening social cohesion. In contrast, 
Street’s contingency version states that if human morality results 
from a contingent process such as the evolutionary process, it is high-
ly improbable and explanatorily expensive to posit objective, neces-
sary, and universal moral facts justification for human morality. In 
what follows, I will offer a brief account of each argument  
Richard Joyce’s argument (2006) is complex, and some of his 
most detailed points are irrelevant for this paper. His basic idea is that 
human morality (i.e., our moral sense) has the function of encourag-
ing prosocial behaviour through the practical clout of moral judge-
ment. This practical clout (known as ‘moral authority) is selected by 
natural selection, given its importance for promoting pro-sociality 
into human beings (Joyce, 2006, p. 57). Something as important as 
pro-sociality cannot be left to prudential calculus. An extra force is 
required to compel us to see moral judgements as having a special 
kind of authority. This is why moral imperatives present themselves 
as objective, independent of our particular wishes or intentions, and 
inescapable, in contrast with etiquette norms (Joyce, 2006, p. 62). 
Considering the need for this evolutionary adaptation, Joyce asks 
us to think about the ineffectiveness prudential considerations have 
in changing some unhealthy habits: just think about how frequently 
our prudential calculations about the danger of consuming high quan-
tities of sugar fail to stop us from drinking soda or other high-
processed beverages (Joyce, 2006, p. 110). So, for this reason, evolu-
tion has crafted the human moral sense, with its moral authority, that 
needs no sort of prudential consideration in order to work. 
Joyce’s argument next step claims that as in the explanation of our 
moral beliefs, moral facts —as understood and characterized by the 
moral realists— do not play any role in our moral lives. Therefore, 
the alleged realist moral truths cannot be justified considering those 
facts, as he states. It is similar to discovering that we do not believe 
that ‘Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo’ because of the causal 
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connection between the historical fact and our belief, but because we 
took a pill that instilled into us the view mentioned above. Inde-
pendently if this belief is true, the sole fact that we believe it as being 
true by another reason different to the causal connection between the 
belief and the very fact itself should leave us in a sceptical position 
about the truth of that belief (Joyce, 2006, p. 181). 
It is possible to notice that this debunking is not ontological but 
epistemological. There is room for the possibility of moral facts exist-
ing and matching our moral beliefs even if we cannot justify them 
using any causal relation, as suggested in Joyce’s analogy. However, 
the point is that in explaining the truth of our moral beliefs, moral 
facts are irrelevant. What does matter is that we have moral beliefs 
whose adaptive function is to promote human prosocial behaviour? 
The contingency version of the evolutionary debunking argument 
by Sharon Street (2006) holds that if evolutionary forces strongly 
influence the content of our moral beliefs, then moral realism posits 
moral facts, which are independent of human evaluative attitudes, is 
untenable. This happens because it is the prey of a dead-end dilem-
ma. Moral realists would have two options: first, claiming a connec-
tion between moral facts and the influence evolutionary forces exert 
over human morality, or second, denying that there is such a connec-
tion. If they choose the latter, the matching between contingently 
formed moral beliefs (created by a contingent and random process) 
and moral facts would be a miraculous coincidence:  
On this view, allowing our evaluative judgements to be shaped by 
evolutionary influences is analogous to setting out for Bermuda and 
letting the course of your boat be determined by the wind and tides: 
just as the push of the wind and tides on your boat has nothing to do 
with where you want to go, so the historical push of natural selection 
on the content of our evaluative judgements has nothing to do with 
evaluative truth. (Street, 2006, p. 121) 
If the former, moral realists would have to explain the connection 
and, in doing so, they would have to claim that evolution favoured or 
selected those individuals who had beliefs that matched moral facts. 
The problem with this account is that it posits an extra entity (moral 
facts). Those facts contrast with the simpler explanation according to 
which our moral beliefs are explained by their adaptive character, i.e., 
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showing how they increase our fitness through having prosocial be-
haviours and attitudes. According to the parsimony principle, holding 
the latter view is explanatorily cheaper than owning the former one 
(Street, 2006, p. 129). 
After this brief account of evolutionary debunking arguments, it is 
necessary to assess how some realists answer those arguments. How-
ever, what is precisely the main challenge moral realists are facing? As 
recently seen, function and contingency arguments are based on a 
bedrock premise: Human morality is pervasively affected by evolu-
tionary forces. Is the moral realist willing to accept this premise? In 
what follows, we can assess two kinds of moral realist arguments:  
assuming the premise as true or denying it. However, it will be argued 
that both of them fail to answer the evolutionary debunking argu-
ments. 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 Copp’s moral realism and the evolutionary debunking ar-
guments  
David Copp thinks that moral realists who accept the influence of 
evolutionary forces on our moral beliefs are not forced to admit their 
capacity to track moral facts selected moral beliefs. He argues that it 
is enough to accept the Darwinian forces indirect effect upon moral 
beliefs. By the cumulative effect of natural selection on our moral 
beliefs, they became moral truths through rational correction. This 
key idea in Copp’s argument is known as the ‘quasi-tracking thesis’. 
In his words:  
 The quasi-tracking thesis is the thesis that Darwinian forces so af-
fected our psychology that our moral beliefs tend to quasi-track the 
moral facts. (Copp, 2008, p. 194) 
Copp starts arguing that, as the human ability to detect predators 
evolved because of its high adaptive value4, so did the human ability 
 
4 Adaptive value represents the usefulness of a trait that can help a biological organ-
ism to survive in its environment. That trait is inheritable, and it can help offspring to 
cope with new surroundings. 
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for quasi-tracking moral truths (Copp, 2008, p. 195). His argument is 
twofold. The first part offers a metaethical explanation that specifies 
the truth conditions of our moral beliefs. The second one explains 
why natural and cultural evolution shaped those beliefs so that they 
were able to quasi-track the kind of moral facts posited by moral 
realists. Copp offers a ‘society centred’ metaethical explanation ac-
cording to which morality has the function of helping society to fulfil 
its needs (Copp, 2008, p. 198). Those needs include their very bare 
existence, a system of cooperation between their members and the 
necessity of keeping peaceful and cooperative relationships with 
neighbouring societies (Copp, 2008, p. 200). This explanation deems 
a moral proposition to be true if the moral code that best helps satisfy 
society needs includes an implicit norm that is identical or very simi-
lar to the moral proposal. So, the claim ‘torturing is wrong’ will be 
true if the moral code that best helps society satisfy its needs includes 
a norm that condemns or forbids torturing (Copp, 2008, p. 199). 
The second part of Copp’s argument concurs with the typical evo-
lutionary explanation. Our human ancestors tended to have altruist 
and cooperative attitudes at an early stage of evolution, given their 
adaptive value. Attached to this propensity, a capability to be guided 
by norms evolved. Eventually, those human ancestors having this 
skill would share norms that reinforced several prosocial attitudes. 
Finally, as an outcome of this process, humans tended to form moral 
beliefs that promoted social stability, peace and cooperation (Copp, 
2008, p. 201).  
According to Copp, moral beliefs will tend to be considered moral 
truths as they are slowly corrected by rational reflection and delibera-
tion, ultimately matching with the set of norms that helps fulfil hu-
man needs of cooperation and well-being (Copp, 2008, p. 202).  
A key remark about Copp’s account is that he conceives this kind 
of moral realism as bearing counterfactuals, i.e., ancestral environ-
mental conditions were different from those displayed today, or the 
human psychology was different from that which evolved. Moral 
beliefs would become similar to those expressed in moral realist 
truths (Copp, 2008, pp. 197-198). 
There are at least three main objections that could convincingly be 
raised against Copp’s argument. The first objection is that there are 
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possible or conceivable scenarios where a different set-up of human 
psychology could result in different moral beliefs from that currently 
held. Some psychological studies, for example, have shown that hu-
man beings justify aggressions when perceived as an answer to a 
group threat (López, 2017, p. 20). This human psychological feature 
becomes apparent in cases as, for example, the justification of the 
United States of America invasion of Iraq in 2003. The debate held 
was focused on assessing if Iraq had the allegedly ‘mass destruction 
weapons’ or if it just was a smokescreen for pursuing particular eco-
nomic interests related to the oil wells. In general, there is a consen-
sus considering the justification of the self-defence-aggression. One 
could imagine a different human psychological setting, resulting in 
another moral assessment of the situation (see Darwin [1886]1989, 
p.99). However, Copp could argue that, despite this possibility, given 
the needs of society, and given the quasi-tracking thesis, a rational 
correction would change this initial moral view making it more adap-
tive, matching it with the moral truth. However, here comes the sec-
ond and stronger objection. Copp suggests that this ‘rational correc-
tion’ is not independent or detached from the evolutionary process of 
forming moral beliefs. 
Notwithstanding, there is no independent way of determining the 
direction of the correctness other than relying on the evaluative atti-
tudes that evolution has selected for human beings. Applying this 
reasoning to the previous example would mean that justifying aggres-
sion if the group faces a threat is not an objective moral standard 
existing independently of human evolved nature and psychology. On 
the contrary, it is the expression of that evolved contingent nature. 
So, Copp’s assessment and determination of ‘morally correct’ are 
guided and directed by evolutionary forces; he cannot escape from 
them. In other words, Copp’s ideal of what is morally correct is an 
evolutionary product, and as such, it is contingent. As Street argues, if 
moral beliefs track society needs of cooperation and if the fulfilment 
of those social needs is what moral facts are made of, those “facts” 
are contingent on human evolved nature and the authoritative moral 
force they allegedly exert over human actions is not something ‘ob-
jective’ independent of the human nature (Street, 2008, p. 213). 
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In this way, Copp had two options: To deny that ‘rational moral 
correction’ is an evolutionary product, or to argue that, given the 
needs of society, those needs constitute the guiding principles that 
determine what is morally correct because they are ‘objective’, ‘de-
contextualized’ and ‘independent’ from any contingent evolutionary 
issue. As it was said above, Copp’s moral realism accepts the bedrock 
premise of evolutionary debunking arguments according to which 
human morality is affected by evolutionary forces what eliminates the 
first option. However, taking society needs as the guiding principles 
has a price that Copp’s moral realism cannot afford, which raises the 
third objection and the strongest one. 
Copp’s ‘society centred’ metaethical explanation assumes that mo-
rality has the function of helping society to fulfil its needs, which 
include its very basic existence, a system of cooperation between its 
members and the necessity of keeping peaceful and cooperative rela-
tionships with neighbouring societies (Copp, 2008, p. 200). These 
‘objective’ needs deem the guiding principles that determine the di-
rection that evolutionary forces exert on human morality. However, 
Copp ignores that those needs can be fulfilled in different —even 
contradictory— ways.  
According to David Wong, who agrees with Copp, the function 
of morality is to keep social cohesion and promote individual flour-
ishment. This function is appropriately accomplished by fulfilling 
human interests and needs (Wong, 2006, pp. 39-40; 69). However, 
according to Wong, those needs can be satisfied in at least two differ-
ent ways, which correspond to the big ethical systems of the Western 
and Eastern society, i.e., a utilitarian, communitarian, conservative 
ethical system, characteristic of Eastern society, in which the group’s 
well-being is more important than the individual one, and a deonto-
logical ethical system, distinctive of Western society, in which indi-
vidual rights and well-being are more prominent than communitarian 
ones. So, if Wong is right, moral realism faces a tough obstacle: it 
would have to admit that, in some cases, there are some different 
facts, which, despite being different —even contradictory—, are sim-
ultaneously true if they succeed in fulfilling society’s needs. This posi-
tion contradicts the very nature of the kind of moral realism Copp is 
prone to defend. In showing this point, it would be helpful to turn 
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back to the example of the morality of torturing. A radical communi-
tarian ethical system would justify torture in cases where the commu-
nity’s welfare is at risk. An individualist deontological ethical system 
would ban torture regardless of its possible benefits to society. So, 
Copp’s realism should admit that both are useful for getting social 
cohesion, two different moral facts are simultaneously true, one 
claiming that torturing is wrong at any cost and the other one denying 
it.  
After examining the realists’ option of accepting the premise of 
the pervasive influence of evolution on human morality, it is neces-
sary to review the reply to evolutionary debunking arguments of the 
realists that deny such an influence. According to the latter, evolution 
forges moral intuitions initially, but there is a point where those intui-
tions can be neutralized or even corrected. That correction results in 
moral facts with mentioned features of being ‘objective’, ‘universal’ 
and independent of human evaluative tendencies. So, the next section 
is devoted to assessing whether this kind of moral conception can 
properly answer evolutionary debunking arguments.  
2.2 Shafer-Landau and Huemer’s moral realism and the evolu-
tionary debunking arguments 
Russ Shafer-Landau argues that moral realism can survive evolu-
tionary debunking arguments, provided that it can show that there are 
specific moral beliefs, doxastic moral dispositions or moral faculties 
that are immune to the evolutionary influence (Shafer-Landau, 2012, 
p. 5). Once the primitive moral beliefs are identified, Shafer—Landau 
argues that they can be corrected, changed, and set free of evolution-
ary influences (Shafer-Landau, 2012, p. 6). 
According to Michael Huemer, some ‘formal intuitions’, which are 
good tokens of doxastic dispositions, are immune to selective pres-
sures:  
[They] are particularly plausible candidates for being products of ra-
tional reflection. They are not plausibly regarded as products of emo-
tional bias, cultural or biological programming, or self-interested bias 
(Huemer, 2008, p. 386)  
So, for example, in a situation requiring a moral assessment, a per-
son could reason that  
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If x is better than y and y is better than z, then x is better than z” or 
that “If two states of affairs, x and y, are so related that y can be pro-
duced by adding something valuable to x, without creating anything 
bad, lowering the value of anything in x, or removing anything of 
value from x, then y is better than x. (Huemer, 2008, p. 386) 
Huemer considers that reasoning is free from biological pro-
gramming. This could be true. However, the mentioned formal intui-
tions are useless in any moral setting if the evaluative terms ‘better 
than, ‘bad’ or ‘valuable’ are not clearly defined and clarified. And this 
precisely is what evolution provides to humans. So, these moral intui-
tions by themselves are not enough to guide a human being to adopt 
some particular system of moral beliefs. 
Shafer-Landau considers that the main evidence for measuring the 
influence of evolutionary forces on human moral beliefs is the extent 
to which those beliefs are adaptive. Moral realism will demonstrate 
that evolutionary influence on those beliefs is not ubiquitous if some 
moral beliefs are not adaptive.  Shafer-Landau provides some possi-
ble examples:  
Those that counsel impartial benevolence, compassion for vulnerable 
strangers, kindness to small animals, concern for distant peoples and 
future generations, and speaking truth to power (Shafer-Landau, 
2012, p. 8) 
A basic evaluative tendency can be defined as a proto-evaluative 
judgment that consists of a non-reflexive or linguistic impulse aimed 
to achieve a behaviour called for or necessary. Its appealing nature is 
due to the evolutionary needs that it is supposed to fulfil, increasing 
its biological fitness. 
According to Shafer-Landau, the beliefs mentioned above are not 
adaptive, and he challenges evolutionary debunkers to provide a di-
rect or indirect evolutionary explanation for each belief. He thinks 
that such a possibility is remote (Shafer-Landau, 2012, p 8). However, 
it is not difficult to offer a direct or indirect evolutionary explanation 
of those beliefs. Among all of Shafer-Landau’s potentially non-
adaptive moral beliefs, the last one, “speaking truth to power”, is 
different from the rest, at least in one significant concern: the first 
four beliefs can be convincingly considered as a set of ancestral eval-
uative tendencies which, as it will be seen, have widened their range 
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of application, while the last one can be deemed to be a token of 
what anthropologists and evolutionists call the ‘reverse dominance 
hierarchy5. This is a human sense of anti-hierarchical feelings ex-
pressed through a predisposition to reject being dominated (Boehm, 
1999).  
It is possible to find the evolutionary origins of this predisposition 
in the hunter-gatherer societies classified as immediate return systems 
(Woodburn, 1982). In this system, group members obtain a direct 
return from their labour in hunting and gathering. The gain in hunt-
ing and gathering requires a fair immediate distribution to guarantee 
cooperation in the next hunt-gathering activity. Accordingly to Her-
bert Gintis, Carel Van Schaik e Christopher Boehm:  
Social dominance aspirations are successfully countered because in-
dividuals do not accept being controlled by an alpha male and are ex-
tremely sensitive to attempts of group members to accumulate power 
through coercion. (Gintis, Van Schaik & Boehm, 2015, p. 336) 
In contrast, the delayed-return system societies are —as the fossil 
record suggests— recent, appearing some 10.000 years ago. In these 
societies, the availability of accumulated material wealth allows those 
who seek social dominance to control resources and allies so that 
social domination is possible through the material control of means 
of production and obtained goods. This is the kind of system exhibit-
ed currently. However, since it is relatively recent, humans show their 
natural ‘reverse dominance hierarchy’ attitude. And given the effect 
of encephalization on enhancing the mean fitness of group members, 
the way this attitude is expressed is not through violence or physical 
coercion but through the capacity to motivate, persuade, or reach a 
consensus (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). And ‘speaking truth to power can 
be deemed a token of any of these attitudes. Speaking truth to power 
is a way to reach a consensus for unchaining repressed anger against 
power and dominance. The evolutionary roots of moral beliefs about 
 
5 This phenomenon can be considered as an extension of the leveling coalitions seen 
among primate males. Female chimpanzees in captivity act collectively to neutralize 
alpha male bullies, and wild chimpanzees form coalitions to punish high-ranking 
males. Bonobos in the wild have been observed to behave in a similar way (Gintis & 
Schaik, 2013, p. 336). 
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counselling impartial benevolence, showing compassion to vulnerable 
strangers, being kind to small animals and caring about distant people 
and future generations can be safely said to be just samples of the 
contingent process of widening the circle of human moral concern. 
These benevolent and caring attitudes are initially displayed towards 
family members (Street, 2006, p. 115) through some psychological 
mechanisms, which are then exapted or co-opted for favouring 
strangers and outsiders (McNamara & Henrich, 2017).6  
A moral realist could reply that precisely the process of widening 
the circle of moral concern is the very process of reaching moral 
truths (Singer, 2011, p. 116). This reasoning is incorrect because there 
are reasons for thinking that there is no actual widening but a dis-
placement of the circle. Even in the case that there is an enlargement 
of the circle of moral concern, the way human beings consider who is 
inside the circle is contingent and somewhat arbitrary, or it is depend-
ent on accidents and historical circumstances, rendering doubtful the 
existence of universal and independent moral truths. That the human 
moral circle is displacing instead of widening is seen in cases where 
knowing facts about the world has made humans change the focus of 
their moral concerns rather than become more tolerant. For example, 
the fact that there are not women who have been awarded supernatu-
ral evil powers by the devil has stopped the killing of alleged witches. 
This does not mean that humans have enlarged their tolerance circle. 
This only means that human beings are sure that there are no witches, 
but if there were such creatures, surely some humans would consider 
it moral to kill them. Similarly, attributing immigrants most felonies 
and crimes in the host country gives xenophobic people reasons for 
hating and condemning foreigners in their country. Distrusting, blam-
ing and even punishing allegedly dangerous people are an ancestral 
evaluative tendency that only changes its focus, but it does not disap-
pear.  
 
6 Exaptation or co-option are concepts that describe a shift in the function of a trait 
during evolution. The classical example is the exaptation of the feathers which initial-
ly evolved for heat regulation and subsequently acquired the function of assisting 
flight (Gould and Vrba, 1982). 
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One can argue that there are concrete cases where a widening of 
moral concern occurs, for example, considering animals as bearers of 
rights or applying human rights regardless of ethnicity, age, gender, 
etc. This is undeniable, but this widening is subjected to contingent 
happenings and evolutionary facts in such a way that the idea of 
reaching the universal, objective and independent moral truths is 
impossible.  
The evolution of human social stereotyping, for example, is a pro-
cess that significantly affects the real-world application of human 
rights. Social stereotyping has an adaptive role because it helps hu-
mans save energy in gathering and discriminating useful information 
about the social environment. Human beings have neither the cogni-
tive capacity nor the time to perceive each person individually and in 
detail; for this reason, stereotypes are convenient evolutionary devices 
(Hutchinson & Martin, 2015, p. 292). According to some studies, 
there are racial stereotypes that affect the application of human rights. 
In contrast with gender stereotypes, the identification of the racial 
ones is not easy:  
For instance, in many restaurants in big cities of Western Europe, the 
menial kitchen work is mostly done by Black or immigrant workers, 
whereas the waiters are often White. Similar observations could be 
made with regard to Black or Filipino domestic workers in economi-
cally developed countries. Again, the parallel with gender stereotypes 
may help to highlight the different legal relevance of the two situa-
tions: if the same labour division were gendered, in the sense that 
women were predominantly working in the kitchen and the men 
waiting on tables, gender stereotypes would or at least could be in-
voked. However, the racial contract is much harder to break down 
through (human rights) law. (Möschel, 2016, p. 139) 
Why are currently gender stereotypes more addressed? Is it due to 
contingent historical or political situations? It is not the aim of this 
paper to answer these questions; however, it seems again that the 
focus of human moral concerns has been displaced, in the sense that 
some historical and critical facts could make humans focus more on 
some of them than others. Realists could argue that even though 
racial stereotypes are harder to break down, the identification of them 
is possible, and that means that progress toward a free stereotyped 
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society is possible. To this, debunkers could offer two replies: first, 
those stereotypes are not necessarily negative, that human beings 
cannot avoid them, and even a special kind of morality could defend 
their necessity. The subset of negative stereotypes could be called 
‘prejudices’, but there are positive stereotypes as that Filipinos are 
more caring than others towards children or the elderly (Möschel, 
2016, p. 120). Even this sort of ‘positive’ stereotype could be used by 
a nationalist Filipino to claim the superiority of his countrymen over 
the rest of the non-Filipinos. It could be argued that stereotyping by 
itself is not good or bad and, as it was said above, social stereotypes 
pave the way for smooth social interactions. So, is eliminating stereo-
types desirable? Is it even possible? An evolutionary debunker could 
argue that the very process of eliminating stereotypes entails the im-
possibility of escaping human evaluative tendencies and that this 
attempt will have the same success as that of Copp’s intention of 
correcting evaluative ancestral tendencies. He will use them in the 
process of correcting them.  
The second reply a debunker could pose is that increasing the 
range of beings included in human moral concerns is a contingent 
process, as the mentioned expansion is based on the globalizing 
transformation that began in the XVII century. It was boosted by 
technology, capitalism, mobility and new ideas about the individuals 
(Tönnies, 1947). This globalization is not unavoidable because if the 
factors that made it possible collapse, the globalizing tendency could 
also crash. A scenario of a technological and communicative collapse, 
even though remote, is possible (Torres, 2017). 
2.3 Moral progress and moral realism 
Huemer, when confronting Peter Singer (2011), denies that moral 
progress consists in widening the circle of human moral concerns. 
According to Huemer, there are cases in which changes do not imply 
an expansion of moral concern but a plain improvement of moral 
considerations. He gives some examples of it: the idea that capital 
punishment is a disproportionate sanction to cases of adultery, theft 
and other minor crimes, or the estrangement from traditional morali-
ties in which premarital sex is considered morally wrong (Huemer, 
2016, p.1998). However, these examples fail because, in the first case, 
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evidence shows that the support for the death penalty decreases by 
exposure to international contextual information (LaChappelle, 
2014). This means not only that the new moral consideration is, in a 
broad sense, a widening of the moral concern, but that it could also 
be explained by the former process of globalization mentioned above 
with all its concomitant contingency. The second example, i.e., the 
relaxation of moral standards about premarital sex, also fails in show-
ing Huemer’s point because this could be considered the outcome of 
the feminist sexual liberation (Clavan, 1972), which implies that at the 
core of this moral attitude resides a broadening of the circle of moral 
worries that consists in including women’s sexuality inside it.   
Huemer considers that moral progress is the overcoming of prej-
udices and biases (2016, p. 2001), and based mainly on two ideas, 
argues that moral liberal principles are the true ones. In the first 
place, he considers that, as the history of scientific knowledge shows, 
truths are gradually grasped over time, and he believes that, accord-
ingly, humanity has progressively reached moral liberal truths. Sec-
ondly, the fact that a big proportion of humans worldwide has gradu-
ally adopted not only one but also a cluster of such liberal moral 
truths cannot be explained by biological or cultural evolution (Hue-
mer, 2016, p. 2000). The reason why Huemer denies that biological 
evolution can explain moral progress is weak and based on an over-
simplification of the way evolution works. He tries to argue that there 
are not ‘liberal genes’ and that the reproductive success commonly 
attributed to adaptive biological traits cannot be ascribed to liberal 
moral beliefs: 
[…] there is no reason to think, for example, that in the 1960s, racists 
started having fewer children than non-racists and thus failed to pass 
on their racist genes, or that during the last 200 years, people who 
supported democracy started having more children than those who 
supported dictatorship. (Huemer, 2016, p. 1995) 
This makes apparent the naïve and misleading conception of the 
evolution of morality that Huemer uses for arguing in favour of his 
realist account.   
He also believes that the convergence reached by Western society 
in relation to liberal ideals and values cannot be properly explained by 
cultural evolution understood as a process with an unpredictable 
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result or with a random direction.  The development of liberal moral 
values has to do with a set of changes in attitudes on issues such as 
slavery, war, torture, women’s suffrage, and so on; all these items 
converge together in a way that shows certain coherent ethical stand-
points (Huemer, 2016, p. 1999), which can be more convincingly 
explained by positing moral facts: 
Why was slavery abolished? Because slavery was unjust. Why have 
human beings become increasingly reluctant to go to war? Because 
war is horrible. Why has liberalism in general triumphed in human 
history? Because liberalism is correct. These, I suggest, are the most 
simple and natural explanations (Huemer, 2016, p. 2000) 
However, an evolutionary explanation of moral convergence is 
possible without postulating universal, human-independent and ob-
jective moral facts. In fact, an evolutionary debunker can accept the 
existence of moral progress in the same way as she accepts the pro-
gress of biological traits, as, for example, the human eyes, in accom-
plishing its function of seeing. 
In one important sense, evolutionary convergence of moral values 
is not different from convergence in cases of the evolution of com-
plex structures such as the human eye, which has reached such a level 
of specialization that is so sophisticated that it makes appealing the 
idea of a pre-existing model to which the evolution of vision has to 
arrive. The human eye has reached such a level of specialization that 
the possibility of morphological variation of its structure has been 
considerably reduced. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
biological aptitude is a complex relationship between the biological 
trait and the medium through which this trait develops, in such a way 
that the adaptation of a biological trait supervenes on its physical 
features (Sturgeon, 1985, pp. 74-75). This means that the relationship 
between the physical properties of the trait and the environment in 
which these trait works determines its level of biological aptitude. In 
other words, despite the human eye’s level of specialization and com-
plexity, this trait could have had a physically different structure and 
successfully accomplish its function nonetheless. The existence of 
exaptations evidences the proof of such a separation between physi-
cal properties and function, i.e., traits that acquire different functions 
from those initially selected for (as in the case of the wings of birds) 
 
 104 
and vestiges, i.e., traits that lose their initial function because of a 
change in the environment (for example the hind legs of the whale). 
Vestiges and exaptations show that, in the case of biological traits, 
speaking about progress is possible, with the caveat that this progress 
—understood as the gradual increase of the biological aptitude of the 
trait— is dependent on the environment in which the trait accom-
plishes its function (Gould & Vrba, 1982). 
Those considerations can be applied to the evolution of morality. 
Suppose the function of morality is to strengthen social cohesion. In 
that case, the trait on which morality is based (whatever it be) in-
creases its fitness depending on its complex interactions with the 
environment. Given these complex relationships between the trait 
and its surroundings, liberal morality seems to be the fittest for ac-
complishing the function of promoting social cohesion. However, 
this kind of morality is not inherently what best attains that function. 
As stated above, there are two different moralities that best serve the 
purposes of producing social harmony (a Western individualist, liber-
al and an Eastern communitarian conservative ethics), which shows 
that morality’s function depends on the environment. Given the cur-
rent large-scale globalization process, it is no surprise that a liberal 
individual centred ethical system becomes fittest. However, as in the 
case of human vision, this does not mean that there is a pre-existing 
moral model to which moral progress is directed.  
In the same way, as vision may become a vestige in some peculiar 
circumstances (abyssal fishes’ and salamander’s eyes are good exam-
ples of it), liberal individual-focused morality could become vestigial 
in different environmental conditions those fuelled by globalization. 
This makes it apparent that no evolved trait progresses in a definite 
and pre-fixed direction. And suppose it is accepted that morality is 
such an evolved trait. In that case, a right understanding of the way 
evolution works has the awkward conclusion that there are no uni-
versal, context-independent, and free from human interests moral 
facts that are inherently successful in achieving the function of moral-
ity. 
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2.4 A possible answer to debunkers: blurring the distinction 
between facts and values 
In a recent paper, Martínez, Mosqueda & Oseguera (2020) pre-
sented a critical examination of Street’s argument. They aimed to 
show that, given the features of the language of moral realism, i.e., its 
cognitivism, its representative intention and its claim that there are 
moral facts, there is no valid reason -as Street argues- for denying 
moral realist language a less objective status from that attributed to 
other types of languages used for describing the world. 
In remarking the representational character of the language of 
moral realism, that is, in stressing the fact that moral statements in-
tend to describe states of affairs or facts about the world, Martínez, 
Mosqueda & Oseguera (2020) make apparent that the moral language 
behaves in a very similar way to another type of representational lan-
guages:  
Both the sentence ‘corruption is common’ and ‘corruption is incor-
rect are statements that we can affirm or deny and to which we can 
assign truth values based on facts. By taking moral language as repre-
sentational, our evaluative judgments aim to describe a reality that is 
independent of our way of speaking and thinking about it (Martínez, 
Mosqueda & Oseguera, 2020, p. 111) 
One of the key points of the authors’ critical analysis is to make 
apparent that Street’s debunking of moral realism pretends to be 
completely ontological (arguing that there exist independent moral 
facts), is the case that her debunking has an important semantic ele-
ment (posing the existence of independent moral truths) that is un-
derestimated because, in considering this semantic dimension, as it 
was already said, the moral language is not different from any other 
kind of representational language. 
This way of answering Street’s evolutionary debunking arguments 
reveals that, at least at the semantic level, there seems to exist in hu-
man beings the tendency to use language in such a way that there is 
no clear distinction -as debunkers claim- between facts and value. 
This distinction is fundamental for running the debunking argument 
against moral realism. Doubting about this distinction seems to ques-
tion the validity of evolutionary debunking arguments.  
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So, for example, according to Joyce, in assessing the biological fit-
ness of an arithmetic belief such as 1+1=2 (an alleged proposition of 
fact), it is necessary to consider its truth:  
False mathematical beliefs just aren’t going to be very useful. Sup-
pose you are being chased by three lions, you observe two quit the 
chase, and you conclude that it is now safe to slow down. The truth 
of “1 + 1 = 2” is a background assumption to any reasonable hy-
pothesis of how this belief might have come to be innate (Joyce, 
2006, p. 182) 
On the other hand, in assessing the biological fitness of moral be-
liefs (proposition of value), it is possible to make sense of their use 
independently of their truth (Joyce, 2006, p. 183). Moreover, as dis-
cussed, it is difficult to identify a state of affairs depicted by a moral 
proposition, which seems to be required to deem it true or false. So, 
evolutionary debunking arguments require a clear distinction between 
facts and values to be raised. 
However, the distinction between “thin” and “thick” concepts 
(Williams, 1985) seems to challenge the aforementioned fact-value 
distinction. Thin evaluative terms assess actions and behaviours by 
means of plain evaluative adjectives, without committing themselves 
too much, be it good or bad, or right or wrong, for example; ‘thick’ 
concepts, on the other hand, seem somehow to involve both an eval-
uation and non-evaluative description. Examples of such concepts 
are ‘generous’, ‘selfish’, ‘just’, ‘unfair’ and ‘cruel’, epistemic concepts 
such as ‘open-minded’ and ‘gullible’, or even aesthetic concepts such 
as ‘gracious’ or ‘harmonious’, among others. As it is apparent, the 
application of these kinds of concepts is determined by the way the 
world is. This means that ‘thick’ concepts tend to blur the distinction 
between fact and value because as they allegedly describe the world, 
they also implicitly carry an evaluation of it. And the key point is that 
there seems to exist thick irreducible concepts, i.e., concepts that 
cannot be factored in terms of value and description separately: 
Most famously, thick concepts have been held to break down the 
‘fact–value’ distinction. There are at least two fact-value distinctions 
that thick concepts have been held to break down. First, we might 
make a semantic distinction between two different kinds of meaning, 
two different kinds of things we can do with language: we can evalu-
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ate, and we can describe. Thick concepts have been held to under-
mine any sharp distinction between non-evaluative description and 
evaluation, which some think is a problem for certain metanormative 
views (Roberts, 2018, p.162) 
In other words, the intuition expressed in Martinez et al. (2020) 
about the nature of moral language has clear support in the existence 
of thick concepts. The key question is to what extent the nature of 
this kind of concept is present in our language and specifically in our 
moral discourse. In fact, it seems that moral neuroscience and psy-
chology experiments seem not to include serious research about thick 
concepts. Instead, when researching human moral language, they 
focus exclusively on thin concepts (Abend, 2011). Thus, it is still 
necessary to focus on this empirical research. 
From the conceptual and philosophical view, the intuitions about 
the nature of moral language and its connection with representational 
language, in general, are clear, and the related empirical research 
could be of great help:  
But why is it necessary to postulate a special capacity that allows us 
to see the evaluative traits? As Platts points out, “why to change the 
case, we cannot account for the recognition that people make of the 
malicious, the loyal, the aggressive, the dishonest, simply in parallel 
terms to those who realize their recognition of others traits in the 
world?” (Platt, 1983, p. 4, apud, Martinez et al., 2020, p. 112) 
Applying this intuition to Joyce’s example provided above, one 
could notice the unconvincing account according to which the fact 
about the quantity or number of lions is really a ‘fact’ of the world, in 
contrast with the unspecific moral values, which are not supposed to 
be facts. Is it not the case that, at least in this example, the whole 
situation is perceived as dangerous (a thick concept)? Would it not be 
a cheaper way in which evolution could improve the human probabil-
ity of survival? For evolution, the shaping of a single mechanism for 
describing and valuing the world could be more effective than two 
separate mechanisms for detecting ‘plain facts’ on the one hand and 
for valuing those facts on the other. However, the determination of 





This paper explores two versions of evolutionary debunking ar-
guments (function and contingency). It makes it apparent that those 
variants share the basic premise that human moral capabilities are the 
product of evolution. As a corollary, we added that those capabilities 
had been selected for accomplishing a function, and contingency 
plays an important and key role in their evolution. The conception of 
human morality as a set of universal and objective propositions that 
depict a priori states of affairs, existing independently of any human 
evaluative tendency, is debunked.  
Realists’ attempts to answer evolutionary debunking arguments 
are classified as those who consider that their main premise can be 
accepted and those who consider that morality requires denying the 
pervasive influence of evolutionary forces in human morality. In the 
first case (Copp’s society centred realism), it is evident that at some 
point, this theory requires to step further from evolutionary debunk-
ing arguments’ main premise. In trying to keep it, it commits a con-
tradiction in the sense that morality cannot bear counterfactuals (as 
this theory claims). In addition, in the process of ‘rational’ correction 
of ‘wrong moral propositions’, human beings cannot be free of their 
evaluative tendencies. This view is unaware of the fact that, in cor-
recting the supposed wrong evaluative tendencies, human beings are 
inevitably using them. 
The second branch of realism tries to show that some moral be-
liefs are free of evolutionary tendencies. However, those moral beliefs 
that are allegedly free of evolutionary forces are shown to have some 
kind of connection with evolutionary forces, which demonstrated 
that, in assessing human moral claims, the very same evaluative 
tendencies are at work.  
In spite of being attractive and compelling, the idea of moral pro-
gress needs to be carefully examined because it entails the dangerous 
belief that there are pre-fixed ideas toward which morality has to be 
directed. It is dangerous in the sense that progress could make human 
beings blind to the idea that a sudden or gradual change in human 
conditions and context could produce a different moral response 
from that advocated by such progress. From a biological point of 
view, progress can be explained, but, as it was shown in this paper, it 
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is context-dependent, and it has to be situated in a definite frame. 
The existence of vestiges and co-optations demonstrate that every 
biologically evolved trait is dependent on its complex relationship 
with the environment and that it is not immune to the possibility of 
disappearing. And if morality is such a trait, it is neither immune to 
drastic changes and pressures. It cannot be forgotten that current 
moral progress is sustained in a globalizing context, which is contin-
gent and, as such, could collapse. In such a remote (however possi-
ble) situation, it would not be a surprise if some old forms of moral 
responses reappeared or that some others, based on primitive emo-
tions such as fear and distrust, directed the appropriate moral re-
sponses (once the new context is given).  
Finally, this paper argues that the evolutionary debunking argu-
ments are based on a key distinction between facts and values. How-
ever, there are some reasons for doubting that this distinction is the 
natural setting of human language. So, it is necessary to look for a 
particular kind of concept called ‘thick concepts’, which show that 
there is a capacity in human language to describe and value the world 
simultaneously.  This could be the way natural evolution shaped our 
moral language. In any case, the determination of this possibility 
needs empirical support. 
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